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Moral Rationalism and Demandingness in Kant 
MARCEL VAN ACKEREN 








We discuss Kant’s conception of moral rationalism from the viewpoint of recent debates, 
which have distinguished different forms of moral rationalism. We argue that Kant’s version, 
‘silencing’, is different and stronger than currently held versions of moral rationalism and that 
it also differs from versions of silencing that contemporary thinkers advocate. We then 
discuss Kant’s version of silencing in the context of the moral demandingness debate and 
argue that silencing can make a perfect duty very demanding. However, it is important that 
whilst in cases of conflict between duty and personal happiness the normative standing of the 
latter is silenced, silencing does not require that agents do all they can in the case of imperfect 
duties. We finally indicate the kind of latitude imperfect duties allow for, according to Kant’s 
strong form of Moral Rationalism. 
Keywords: demandingness, overdemandingness, overridingness, moral rationalism, 
silencing, latitude 
 
Moral rationalism (MR) is the view that it is always rational to do what morality demands. 
MR is important for assessing the demandingness of a moral theory if the theory in question 
assumes that conflicts between morality and an agent’s well-being can occur. Recently, a 
number of philosophers have stressed that it is MR, especially overridingness as one of it 
variants, which is responsible for moral demands becoming excessive. After all, no matter 
what morality commands, it could never become too demanding if agents were rationally 




It is certainly not a question whether Kant is a moral rationalist. Yet recent debate has 
revealed that there are profoundly different types of MR. It is therefore essential to ask what 
version of MR Kant holds. This is important, firstly, for understanding Kant’s position in 
terms of the current debate. Secondly, it helps us understand how much Kant’s ethics 
demands of agents and, more specifically, it reveals that Kant’s conception of imperfect duties 
to others is less demanding than some Kantians, such as Jens Timmermann, have recently 
argued. Thirdly, our discussion is of exegetical interest, since Kant himself says different and 
seemingly conflicting things about the priority of morality. He sometimes speaks of how 
morality ‘outweighs’ inclinations (G 4: 400.25-31)1, and sometimes he makes the much 
stronger claim that happiness is reduced ‘below zero’ and to ‘less than nothing’ by morality 
(G 4: 396.8-31). He also claims that ‘nothing has any worth other than that which the law 
determines for it’ (G 4: 436.1-2). This does not so much sound like the idea that morality 
enjoys rational priority, but rather as if morality is the only thing of relevance for human 
existence. 
In this paper, we argue that Kant’s form of MR, namely, silencing, differs from currently held 
versions of MR and from other versions of silencing that contemporary thinkers advocate. 
Silencing in Kant is an exceptionally strong form of MR. In the first section, we introduce 
MR in its different versions. In the second section, we discuss Kant’s various statements 
concerning the authority of morality and discuss his concept of silencing. In the third section, 
we discuss silencing in the context of the moral demandingness debate and argue that 
silencing can make a perfect duty very demanding, but that it does not require agents to do all 
they can in the case of imperfect duties, and we explain why this is the case. We close by 
giving some indications of how this impacts beneficence towards the globally poor. 
Before we begin, four caveats are in order: 
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Firstly, we think that one should distinguish between demandingness, on the one hand, and 
overdemandingness objections, i.e., objections based on the assumption that moral theories 
should not be demanding beyond a certain level, on the other hand. It would take an 
additional and substantial argument beyond the scope of this paper to show that perfect duties 
are overdemanding.2 
Secondly, we will assume that demandingness arises from a conflict between a moral demand 
and an agent’s well-being. This is the standard view of demandingness (see van Ackeren 
2018). We will not spell out well-being any further, since it is clear enough that for Kant well-
being is happiness and closely tied to the satisfaction of inclinations and desires. We will also 
side-step the debate about whether the well-being of agents and patients should be taken into 
account to determine the demandingness of an ethical theory, or only the well-being of agents 
to whom moral demands are addressed.3 
Thirdly, we assume that the demands we discuss are otherwise plausible. We thus exclude 
supposed moral demands that can be discarded for reasons independent of how they impact an 
agent’s well-being. Such an independent reason could, for instance, be that the demand is a 
false negative, a duty that (seemingly) follows from a moral principle but violates our 
intuitive notion of what our concrete duties are to the extent that we think the moral principle 
should be revised.4 In this case, the main problem is not that a demand excessively infringes 
on an agent’s happiness but rather that it should not be required in the first place.  
Fourthly, our focus on the connection of MR and demandingness does not imply that we think 
that MR is the only source of demandingness in Kant, or that it could, on its own, make 
Kant’s ethics demanding. Scheffler plausibly argued that the overall demandingness of a 
normative theory is also influenced by other factors, e.g. the content of the demands and the 
scope of morality (Scheffler 1992: ch.1). In the current paper, we will focus solely on the role 
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of silencing, i.e. Kant’s version of MR, and show how it affects the demandingness of his 
theory. 
1. Moral Rationalisms 
There is no doubt that Kant believes that it is always rational to do what duty commands. 
However, the question of what kind of MR he exactly endorses has received insufficient 
attention, even though many of his descriptions of the absolute authority of duty are 
metaphorical and ambiguous. In what follows, we will begin to situate Kant’s position via a 
dihairetic division of theories of MR.  
Let us begin with a terminological as well as methodological remark. We will phrase 
important parts of our discussion in reasons-terminology, which is certainly apt to capture the 
current debate.5 ‘Practical Reason’ in the sense of a consideration that counts in favour of (or 
against) an action is, however, not a term Kant himself uses. He does, however, speak of a 
‘ground of obligation’ (MM 6: 224.18–22) and ‘the crush of arguments and 
counterarguments’ (TP 8: 286.12-287.17) for and against specific options, of the ‘claims’ of 
inclinations (G 4: 405.11-12) and of the ‘pathological’ self (CPrR 5: 74.11-15). Furthermore, 
Kant speaks of a voice of reason, which ‘makes even the boldest evildoer tremble’ (CPrR 5: 
80.1-2; see also CPrR 5: 35.13-14, RPT 8: 402.13, 402.22, 405.7-35). This voice is a 
consideration that speaks in favour of morality and, indeed, silences all other considerations. 
Kant uses expressions that come very close to the idea of a consideration that favours a course 
of action. It is thus, in principle, appropriate to use the term ‘reason’ when discussing his 
position in the context of a contemporary debate. 





MR in its most general form is the view that it is always rational to do what morality 
demands. This view is often seen as ‘part of our pre-theoretical conception of, or at least 
aspirations for, morality’ (Stroud 1998: 176) or even as a ‘logical property of moral language’ 
(Hare 1981: 24). We can distinguish between a strong and a weak version of this view. Strong 
MR claims that if an act is morally required, then it is what the agent has most reason to do. 
Strong MR presupposes commensurability, i.e. that we can balance the relative strength, 
magnitude or weight of moral and (conflicting) non-moral reasons. Weak MR is based on the 
denial of commensurability (see e.g. Copp 1997). According to this view, we cannot decide 
which reasons are the strongest, since there is no overarching perspective from which we 
could decide this. However, morality is still authoritative in the weak sense of giving 
permissions to act morally albeit not requiring it (see Wittwer 2010: 31-3). We do not have to 
discuss weak MR here6, since it is clear for Kant (as we will see below) that there is an 
overarching perspective. 
MR in its most widely held version, namely as strong MR, is the view that if an act is morally 
required, this is what the agent has most reason to do, from an all-things-considered 
Moral Rationalims (MR)
Strong MR
- If an act is morally 
required, then it is what 
the agent has most 
reason to do
Defeat
- Moral reasons defeat 
non-moral reasons
Silencing / Exclusion
- Moral reasons deprive 
non-moral reasons of 
their strength or exclude 
them from the weighing
Overridingness
- Moral reasons outweigh 
non-moral reasons.
Constraint
- Necessarily, if an act, ϕ, 
is not what there is most 
reason to do then ϕ-ing 
is not morally required
Weak MR
- Moral reasons weighed 
against non-moral 
reasons, but rationality 
permits to act morally.
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normative perspective. Until very recently, most scholars (see e.g. Darwall 2006; more 
references in Archer 2014) have assumed that strong MR comes only in one version, 
according to which strong MR is true because moral reasons always defeat non-moral 
reasons. Recently, Portmore (2011: 42-51) and Archer (2014) have developed an alternative 
version of strong MR. They claim that strong MR can also be explained by constraint: ‘if an 
act, Φ, is not what there is most reason to do then Φ-ing is not morally required’ (Archer 
2014: 106). The constraint version of strong MR (hereafter, strong MR by constraint) does not 
make use of the concept of defeat. This position rather considers it a necessary condition for a 
moral requirement that the required act is what an agent has most reason to do, all things 
considered. This is not the place to discuss strong MR by constraint. Insofar as it is an 
alternative to the defeat version, Kant does not endorse it, since he has plenty to say about 
how the defeat of non-moral reasons takes place. 
Concerning strong MR by defeat, it is important to note that many authors have identified it 
with overridingness. In what follows, it will become clear that this is misleading. 
Overridingness is the view that, from an all-things-considered normative perspective, moral 
reasons, when weighed against non-moral reasons, always trump or outweigh non-moral 
reasons. Even the weakest moral reason exceeds the strongest non-moral reason in normative 
or rational strength.7 However, besides overridingness, there is another way in which a moral 
reason can defeat non-moral reasons. A moral reason can silence (undermine, undercut, 
bracket or exclude8) another reason. Defeat via silencing differs from overridingness because 
in the case of silencing a moral reason is not (always) stronger and does not always outweigh 
non-moral reasons. According to silencing, a moral reason deprives non-moral reasons of 
their normative strength, and non-moral reasons are thus no longer reasons that have to be 




In this section, we explain Kant’s considered conception of MR and contrast it with two other 
forms of MR in order to clarify his conception. Kant’s many different metaphors and 
descriptions that capture the idea that morality enjoys rational superiority can be organized in 
terms of he following three categories: 
1. Kant’s considered view 
Kant’s most consistently employed metaphors that best fit with his overall theory are those of 
exclusion and silencing10: The moral law ‘excludes all inclinations from immediate influence 
on the will’ (CPrR 5: 80.24-5) and ‘excludes altogether the influence of self-love on the 
supreme practical principle’ (CPrR 5: 74.19-21, see also CPrR 5: 74.1-5). Exclusion, as well 
as Kant’s claim that the moral law ‘separates off entirely the influence of inclination from 
action’ (G 4: 400.25-31), have in common that, under certain circumstances, considerations 
other than duty are not merely outweighed in rational deliberation, but they are barred from 
entering rational deliberation.11 Kant himself employs a striking term for this when he praises 
duty for presenting us with a law ‘before which all inclinations are silenced [vor dem alle 
Neigungen verstummen], even though they secretly work against it’ (CPrR 5: 86.28-9, our 
emphasis)12, and ‘in the face of [which] all my inclinations must be silent [verstummen 
müssen]’ (MM 6: 481.31-36). 
To understand silencing as Kant intends it, it is important to distinguish between a 
psychological and a normative conception of silencing. Kant’s conception of silencing is 
normative. It describes how it is rational to exclude certain considerations from some 
deliberations, albeit these considerations might still influence imperfectly rational agents. 
Silencing is supposed to capture the authority of morality in cases of conflict between 
inclinations that have and retain a psychologically powerful effect on the agent and moral 
commands that constitute the only rational option in these conflicts. In contrast to Kant’s 
normative conception, silencing can also be understood as a psychological conception, 
 8 
 
according to which an agent does not take account of her competing inclinations when they 
conflict with what she knows she morally ought to do. In this case, the agent does not 
experience a conflict. This distinction between the normative and the psychological 
conception of silencing will allow us to show in what sense Kant’s version of silencing differs 
from McDowell’s (see below). 
Before we further elucidate Kant’s considered position, it should be noted that there are two 
other clusters of passages, which on a first glance suggest a different conception than 
exclusion or silencing. 
2. Hyperbolic passages expressing a stronger view  
(a) Kant claims that the value of anything other than morality reduces ‘below zero’ (G 4: 
396.8) if it clashes with duty and that the attainment of happiness ‘reduces to less than 
nothing’ (G 4: 396.31). It is unclear how, in Kant’s framework, duty could render other goods 
bad as opposed to merely valueless. After all, if a consideration is to be excluded from 
rational deliberation or its normative standing silenced, it becomes temporarily irrelevant but 
not bad. That duty can reduce other goods to below zero is best seen as a hyperbolic statement 
of Kant’s considered view that when competing with duty inclinations count ‘for nothing’ 
(Rel 6: 49.13). Furthermore, what Kant might be getting at here is the fact that it is bad (below 
zero good) that some agents have more happiness than they deserve. Alternatively, he might 
want to emphasize that choosing something that is ‘below zero’ is not merely a choice for 
something that is valueless in this situation but also a (rationally and morally) wrong or bad 
choice. 
(b) Kant claims that ‘nothing has any worth other than that which the law determines for it’ 
(G 4: 436.1-2). This could be understood as the claim that morality is the only source of value 
and that anything other than morality must derive its goodness from morality.13 However, 
Kant also maintains that the good will, though it is the ‘highest good and the condition of 
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every other’, is not ‘the sole and complete good’ (G 4: 396.24-5, see also TP 8: 283.8-9). In 
lecture notes from the mid 1780s, Kant explicitly states that morality and happiness have 
different ‘sources’ of goodness (L-Eth Mr2 29: 600.36). Furthermore, he stresses that, whilst 
it is also an indirect duty to maintain one’s own happiness to a certain extent (CPrR 5: 93.11-
21), agents have reasons independent of morality to pursue their personal happiness, and that 
this pursuit can be rational if properly constrained by duty.14 Happiness can be non-
derivatively and non-instrumentally good. When Kant says that the moral law ‘determines’ 
the worth of everything else, this should not be understood as if he claimed that all other 
worth or goodness is derivative and a form of moral worth. Rather, he maintains that other 
values are genuine goods but only conditionally good and that they can be silenced by the 
moral law. 
3. Outweighing  
In Groundwork I, Kant describes the priority of morality thus: respect for the moral law 
‘outweighs’ inclinations (G 4: 400.25), and he also speaks of ‘far outweighing’ and 
‘surpassing’ (G 4: 403.28-33). In the Noble Tone, Kant claims that the majesty of the law 
‘outweighs without thought’ (unbedenklich überwiegen) (RPT 8: 402.26) all inclinations. 
These passages seem to indicate that Kant advocates overridingness, i.e. the view that moral 
reasons are always stronger than non-moral reasons, instead of that the latter are excluded or 
silenced by moral reasons. There are two explanations for Kant’s use of ‘outweighing’ here: 
(i) As the quote from the Noble Tone suggests, duty outweighs without a thought. This 
indicates that the agent does not have to do any weighing, because all other considerations are 
excluded or silenced. Supposed outweighing here is a result of the more fundamental process 
of silencing.15 
(ii) In the above-mentioned Groundwork passage (G 4: 400.25-31), Kant claims that the moral 
law ‘outweighs [inclinations], or at least excludes [inclinations] entirely’ from an agent’s 
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choice, and ‘separates off entirely the influence of inclination from action’ (G 4: 400.25-31). 
Here, Kant does not indicate that outweighing is any weaker than entirely excluding. It seems 
that inclinations are deprived of their rational weight by the moral law and thus, trivially, 
outweighed in rational deliberation. If this is right, Kant does not use ‘outweighing’ here (just 
as in RPT 8: 4002) as a technical term in the sense of overridingness as we have introduced it. 
This somewhat loose use of terminology should not surprise us, as we can also still find it in 
contemporary debates when, for instance, Archer (2014) uses ‘overridingness’ to mean both 
trumping in strength and silencing, and Stroud (1998) equates overridingness with MR. 
In addition, Kant might be ignoring the differences between excluding/entirely separating off 
and outweighing here because in Groundwork I he describes the common cognition of 
morality or how common agents experience the immediate force of respect for the moral law 
(see G 4: 403.18-28). The common agent is already aware that morality enjoys rational 
priority, but she lacks the conceptual means to correctly describe and explain this priority. 
Kant believes that every human being can find within their own reason the rational priority of 
morality over anything else (RPT 8: 402.21), but agents without philosophical training tend to 
think of this priority as a form of outweighing or that moral incentives are simply stronger or 
more powerful than other incentives. 
We can now proceed on the assumption that Kant’s version of MR is a version of 
silencing/exclusion. To get a better understanding of Kant’s view, let us compare it with two 
current models, namely, those of Raz and McDowell. Joseph Raz introduces the category of 
so-called ‘exclusionary reason’; reasons which ‘exclude acting for another consideration 
which is a valid reason for acting’ (Raz 1999: 183). An otherwise valid reason is excluded 
from being considered in rational deliberation. Thus, there is no balancing of the normative 
weight of the excluded reason. This relation between reasons is what we find in Kant: in cases 
of conflict between duty and one’s pursuit of happiness, duty becomes an exclusionary reason 
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with regard to all other considerations that otherwise constitute valid reasons for actions, and 
that might still retain their psychological force but lose all normative support. 
The main difference between Raz and Kant lies in their respective conceptions of the class of 
reasons that can exclude other reasons. For Raz, exclusion can potentially obtain between all 
kinds of reasons. Exclusionary reasons are not necessarily moral reasons, and the relation of 
exclusion is not necessarily a relation between moral and conflicting reasons concerned with 
the agent’s well-being.16 For Kant, exclusion/silencing is the prerogative of duty alone, since 
it is grounded in a conditioning relation. Morality is the only unconditional good, and all other 
goods are conditioned in their goodness on morality. Violating morality for the sake of 
happiness is contrary to reason, since it undermines the worth of what it purports to achieve. 
This becomes most apparent in Kant’s doctrine of the highest good:  
[V]irtue as the condition is always the supreme good, since it has no further condition 
above it, whereas happiness is something that, though always pleasant to the possessor 
of it, is not of itself absolutely and in all respects good but always presupposes morally 
lawful conduct as its condition. (CPrR 5: 111.1-5)17 
Comparing Kant to John McDowell, who introduced the term ‘silencing’ as a technical term 
into contemporary debates, is even more instructive. This comparison is of special interest, 
since Dancy (1993: 47-53) argues that McDowell’s position is more extreme and problematic 
than Kant’s. According to Dancy, McDowell holds that all moral reasons silence (Dancy 
1993: 49fn.11). By contrast, ‘Kant allows that moral reasons can be opposed by other reasons 
which may or may not win the day’ (Dancy 1993: 49). 
However, a closer comparison between Kant and McDowell reveals that it is rather the other 
way around. John McDowell believes that: 
 12 
 
the dictates of virtue, if properly appreciated, are not weighed with other reasons at all, 
not even on a scale which always tips on their side. If a situation in which virtue 
imposes a requirement is genuinely conceived as such, according to this view, then 
considerations which, in the absence of the requirement, would have constituted reasons 
for acting otherwise are silenced altogether – not overridden – by the requirement. 
(McDowell 1978: 26) 
There are two important differences between McDowell and Kant. The first concerns the 
scope of silencing. For McDowell, the dictates of virtue must be ‘properly appreciated’ to be 
able to silence. It is only for the virtuous agent that dictates of virtue silence. Furthermore, 
these dictates do not coincide with all morally relevant considerations or reasons:  
A caveat: notice that the position is not that clear perception of any moral reason, 
however weak, silences any reasons of other sorts, however strong. The reasons which 
silence are those which mark out actions as required by virtue. There can be less exigent 
moral reasons, and as far as this position goes, they may be overridden. (McDowell 
1978: 29) 
It is only a sub-class of moral reasons that silences other reasons, namely, those connected to 
requirements of virtue. Other moral reasons can be overridden. McDowell thinks that 
silencing is not a prerogative of the entire class of moral reasons, because not all moral 
reasons silence non-moral reasons, and non-moral reasons can defeat moral reasons. Modern 
philosophers such as Raz, McDowell and also Dancy (1993: 51-52) argue that some (moral or 
other) reasons can exclude or silence other reasons, but this is not a commitment to MR.18 
According to McDowell, silencing only holds for some agents (the virtuous ones) and for 
some moral reasons (dictates of virtue). It is not a theory about the authority of morality in 
general as Kant intends his conception of silencing to be. In other words, McDowell and other 
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modern scholars advocate partial silencing whereas only Kant advocates universal silencing 
as a form of MR. 
The second difference between Kant and McDowell is that for McDowell silencing captures a 
state of harmony between morality and other concerns, such as self-interest. According to 
McDowell, for those who are truly virtuous anything that conflicts with dictates of virtue 
loses its attraction. Above we introduced the distinction between a psychological and a 
normative conception of silencing. This distinction now allows us to explain the second 
difference. To McDowell, silencing does not only settle which reason is, normatively 
speaking, the decisive one, it also solves the psychological conflict or rather it implies that the 
virtuous person does not experience any conflict between dictates of virtue and self-interest. 
Kant’s notion of silencing, by contrast, is supposed to capture the absolute supremacy of 
morality in cases of conflict: in the case of a clash between duty and inclinations, objects of 
inclinations do not lose their attraction for finite rational agents (otherwise, there would not be 
a clash, since the agent would not be drawn to these objects any more). The point of exclusion 
and silencing is that an agent’s inclinations remain unchanged in cases of conflict, but 
whatever non-moral reasons there were to act on one’s inclinations before the conflict, these 
are not to be weighed against duty since they do not count as reasons anymore when they 
would conflict with duty. Kant firmly believes that our sensuous side is governed by laws of 
nature. Thus, what we find attractive, or which objects of inclination appeal to us and how 
much, is contingent and not subject to rational control. According to Kant, some reluctance to 
duty will always remain part of a finite agent, and even virtuous agents can always be tempted 
(see e.g. CPrR 5: 32.35-33.5, Rel 6: 93.4-13) – claiming otherwise means promoting 
enthusiasm (see CPrR 5: 84.22-86.7). Hence, for Kant, agents might be in a psychological 
conflict concerning whether to choose the rational option or an alternative course of action 
which is of great appeal to them, but, as far as reason is concerned, the case is clear. The 
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psychological conflict remains but it is no longer a case of conflicting reasons that need to be 
weighed against each other. 
3. Demandingness 
Kant’s MR has the potential to make his ethics extraordinarily demanding. Once the voice of 
pure practical reason speaks up, there is nothing to be said in favour of any other option 
anymore. However, when Kant speaks of the priority of duty, he usually talks about perfect 
duties or absolute prohibitions in contrast to inclinations, i.e. cases in which there is a direct 
conflict between the commands of duty and inclinations. In these cases, matters are clear: we 
have to omit actions of certain types in all situations. There is nothing rational to be said in 
favour of going against a perfect duty. It is clear that perfect duties can require us to undergo 
great hardship and even to sacrifice our life.19 In cases of conflict between perfect duty and an 
agent’s well-being, it would not even be rational for the agent to weigh well-being against 
duty. After all, there is just one option that has reason on its side.20  
Whilst perfect duties are the paradigm of duty for Kant, he also recognizes imperfect duties. 
These duties, famously, allow for ‘latitude’ (MM 6: 390)21, and they are of particular 
relevance for the issue of demandingness, since they encompass the kind of duties that are 
usually the prime focus of the overdemandingness objection: duties to the globally poor and 
victims of emergencies, such as famine and natural catastrophes. For Kant, these duties of 
rescue and beneficence fall largely under the category of wide duties to others.22 If we want to 
understand how silencing impacts demandingness, as it is standardly discussed, we must look 
at the status of imperfect duties and discuss whether silencing also applies to the promotion of 
obligatory ends. 
One prominent recent answer is provided by Jens Timmermann (2013: 46fn.33) who believes 
that when imperfect duties apply to a specific situation – and whether they do is of course 
contingent – ‘they command with the force of practical necessity and silence the claims of 
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inclination’. According to this reading, for every situation in which we could either benefit 
others or perfect ourselves and in which we could do so without a violation of perfect duties, 
we have decisive reasons to do this (help others and/or improve ourselves). In fact, we have 
absolutely no reason not to do so, even if it requires extreme sacrifice of us. This 
interpretation implies that, within the constraint of perfect duties, we must do as much as we 
can to benefit others (and to perfect ourselves) unless we are in a situation in which it is 
impossible to help others or to perfect ourselves. Latitude thus only extends to the specific 
means to help others, since these means are contingent, and the silencing force of imperfect 
duties is limited only by perfect duties and the principle ‘Ought Implies Can’. It is fair to 
assume that, unless we are very poor ourselves, we are rarely in a situation in which it is 
impossible for us to benefit others (by writing a cheque to Oxfam, etc.). Furthermore, even in 
a utopic future in which global poverty and global disasters do not exist anymore, Kant’s 
ethics might still be very demanding, since imperfect duties do not require that we help the 
worst-off or those worse off than we are, but that we help others achieve their (permissible) 
ends simpliciter. Thus, even in an almost ideal world, this could potentially still require great 
sacrifice, for instance, if others have ends that are difficult to achieve and they need much 
help to do so.23  
Timmermann (2018) himself is aware that his interpretation is in need of strategies to take the 
sting out of overdemandingness objections, and he suggests a number of such strategies. 
However, given that the very demanding view is problematic, even according to its advocates, 
we should ask whether this view is correct. Reading Kant’s conception of imperfect duties 
differently, as more moderately demanding, has, even apart from any textual evidence, the 
advantage that it helps avoid the problem that Timmermann thinks he must solve.  
Whilst silencing in combination with perfect duties can result in extreme demands, we will 
now argue that although it is a matter of silencing as to whether we do comply with an 
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imperfect duty, the absolute rational authority of the moral law does not require that we do as 
much as we can. There is latitude in how and how much we comply with an imperfect duty. 
When we look at passages in which Kant talks about silencing or exclusion, it is significant 
that the context is always a conflict between morality and happiness. This conflict, that 
notably distinguishes Kant’s conception of silencing from McDowell’s, is very important for 
understanding the demandingness of Kant’s ethics. Kant demands that ‘I must first be sure 
that I am not acting against my duty; only afterwards am I permitted to look around for 
happiness’ (TP 8: 283.15-19, our emphasis). Whilst I may never violate duty, Kant does not 
say here that I must make sure that there is no alternative course of action that would promote 
obligatory ends (better or at all) before I can care about my own happiness. Silencing only 
kicks in when acting against duty would be an option or ‘when it is a matter of complying 
with [one’s] duty’ (TP 8: 278.17), not when agents might merely fail to be as good as they 
could be. He says elsewhere that the ‘iron voice’ of reason only speaks up when an agent is 
tempted to be ‘disobedient’ (Ungehorsam) against its commands (RPT 8: 402.21-3), and that 
in cases of ‘collision’, happiness is not to be ‘taken into consideration at all’ (TP 8: 283.6-
10).24 Silencing obtains in cases of a direct conflict between duty and courses of actions 
incentivized by inclinations, or in cases in which I could only satisfy my inclinations by doing 
something that constitutes a violation of duty.  
That Kant speaks of ‘acting against my duty’ (TP 8: 283.15-19, our emphasis), ‘disobedience’ 
to duty (RPT 8: 402.21-3) and ‘complying with duty’ (TP 8: 278.17) suggest that the conflict 
he has in mind here is one where duty commands one course of action and inclinations 
incentivise another one that would require that I externally act against duty. This is, however, 
not the only possible conflict within Kant’s framework. Kant also thinks that there can be a 
conflict when morality and happiness require the same external action, e.g. when prudence 
incentivizes that agents comply with duty in order to avoid punishment or social ostracism. 
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These are also conflicts to which silencing applies, since an agent who pursues her happiness 
in mere conformity with the moral law does not do what morality requires of her: acting from 
respect for the moral law. After all, Kant would think that an agent who returns a deposit only 
to avoid punishment or to preserve her good reputation (see TP 8: 286.31-4) does not 
understand that what matters in this situation is duty alone. This agent’s willing is determined 
by empirical incentives instead of respect for the moral law.25  
Some of the passages we already looked at clearly indicate that, in cases of conflict, not only 
contravening incentives are silenced but all impure incentives. In cases of conflict or when a 
violation of duty is among an agent’s options, the moral law ‘excludes all inclinations from 
immediate influence on the will’ (CPrR 5: 80.24-5) and ‘excludes [inclinations] entirely’ from 
an agent’s choice, and ‘separates off entirely the influence of inclination from action’ (G 4: 
400.25-31, all emphasis our own; see also CPrR 5: 74.19-21). This makes sense since Kant’s 
ethics is concerned with determination of the will. Kantian agents are not asked to deliberate 
between different states of affairs that they can bring about, but between different principles 
or maxims. An agent who, in a case of conflict between morality and inclinations, does 
outwardly the right thing but from a wrong maxim has not done what she had most, and in 
fact in this situation the only reasons, to do: acting from a maxim of respect for the moral law. 
On Kant’s ethical theory the notion of silencing therefore entails that, in cases of conflict, 
impure considerations that incentivize the outwardly correct action are silenced as well. That 
duty, once it speaks up or issues commands or prohibitions, normatively silences all 
inclinations is one of the main senses in which Kant’s form of MR is distinct from other 
theories that focus on state of affairs instead of on principles, motives or intentions.  
Finally, to understand silencing correctly, we must bear in mind that, whilst duty can silence 
all inclinations, it only does so in cases of conflict. When Kant explains latitude in the 
Metaphysics of Morals, he stresses that failure to fulfil an imperfect duty ‘is not in itself 
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culpability (demeritum) … but rather mere deficiency in moral worth’, unless we fail to 
promote an obligatory end as a matter of principle (MM 6: 390.18-29). For Kant, there can be 
actions that lack merit given that an agent did have the opportunity to further an obligatory 
end, yet these meritless actions do not constitute moral violations (see also MM 6: 227.30-
228.3, 384.5-8). In those cases, in which we could further an obligatory end, but not doing so 
would not constitute a violation of duty, silencing does not apply because these are not cases 
of conflict.26 In these cases, agents have latitude regarding how much they want to do to 
further obligatory ends. Kant does not think that any small opportunity to promote an 
obligatory end silences personal ends. 
This reading of Kant’s MR is also supported by the content of the duty of beneficence. 
Beneficence is not the duty to donate to a specific charity, to save a specific person, etc., but 
something much more general, namely, to adopt an end. In this sense, I have satisfied the 
absolute priority of duty if I commit myself (for the right reasons) to absolute prohibitions and 
adopt all obligatory ends. Of course, adopting an end implies some commitment to promoting 
this end. Although an imperfect duty requires that we adopt an end, the imperfect duty does 
not require that we promote this end as far as possible, i.e. it does not silence other concerns 
insofar as they only speak against maximally promoting an obligatory end.27 Having adopted 
an end cannot imply that I am required to promote this end in all situations, to an absolute 
maximum and to the detriment of all other ends. After all, there is a plurality of obligatory 
ends and there are other ends than obligatory ones that are permissible and rational to pursue 
(see G 4: 436.19-22, CPrR 5: 34.11-2, MM 6: 385.1-9).  
It should be noted that there is still one important way in which the absolute authority of 
morality makes obligatory ends special compared to other ends. In cases in which we could 
without much effort help another person in urgent need, for instance take the famous Shallow 
Pond scenarios, not helping is incompatible with having adopted the obligatory end of others’ 
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happiness, or it would constitute an action that shows complete indifference to the needs of 
others. This would be a violation of duty and nothing can be rationally said for it. In such 
cases we are clearly required to help.28 Latitude, after all, only applies to how much we 
further the end, not to whether we adopt this end at all. 
There can be proper conflicts between helping and not helping at all, since not helping at all 
would mean that I made it my principle not to further an obligatory end and this would be 
tantamount to a moral violation (see above). I avoid this conflict, if I make it my maxim to 
help, even if I do not help to the maximum extend that I could help. Beneficence requires us 
to not adopt a maxim that ‘looked with complete indifference on the need of others’ (CPrR 5: 
69.20-35, see also G 4: 423.21-3). It is only a ‘maxim of self-interest [that] would conflict 
with itself if it were made a universal law, that is, it is contrary to duty’ (MM 6: 543.10-2). 
Only maxims of complete disregard for others, or of unlimited self-interest violate 
beneficence. It is not the case that agents must adopt maxims of furthering other people’s 
happiness as much as they possibly can.  
Silencing concerns perfect duties and the question of whether we comply with imperfect 
duties at all. In the case of perfect duties, we either violate them or not, whereas when it 
comes to the question of how and how much we have to further the ends that we are morally 
compelled to adopt, it is not the case that any opportunity to promote an obligatory end 
silences all other concerns. The promotion of obligatory ends and many issues pertaining to 
the question of what and how much we have to do for the poor and needy thus builds on a 
framework different from silencing.  
This obviously raises the question as to what this framework is and how demanding our 
imperfect duties towards the poor are within  this framework. We cannot discuss this in detail 
here and will close with a test case that can provide us with some indications of how Kantians 
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should and should not think of beneficence, given that Kant was a moral rationalist but 
silencing only applies to cases of conflict. Imagine a billionaire who, whenever he has the 
chance to help anyone, gives or donates only 1 cent or a similarly incremental sum. It seems 
strange to say that he promotes an obligatory end, let alone that he does so at every occasion 
and that, given latitude regarding how much we have to do, he does everything that imperfect 
duties to others can require of him. In fact, we might worry that Kant’s ethics might appear 
absurd if it let agents get away with such minuscule contributions.29 That latitude extends to 
the question of how much we must help in each case, however, does not commit Kant to the 
view that anything we do is good enough. This is so for three reasons.  
Firstly, for certain actions it is foreseeable that they will make no difference. In the case of the 
billionaire it is foreseeable for the billionaire that a donation of 1 cent will not enable a charity 
to save one more person.30 Actions that foreseeably do not make a difference do not count as 
promoting an end. After all, once the agent has adopted an end it is not up to her to decide, 
which courses of action are means to promote this end. This is rather a matter of what this end 
consists in and the circumstances. The promotion of ends is governed by the hypothetical 
imperative of skill that ‘whoever wills the end also wills (in conformity with reason 
necessarily) the only means to it that are in his control’ (G 4: 417.30-418.1). This means that 
the application of ends is still governed by a (empirical practical) rational principle and not 
completely up to the agent. Certain means are just not adequate to promote an end an agent 
wills. An agent who could have employed effective means, but only employs means that 
foreseeably make no perceptible difference to promoting the end, thus fails to promote an end 
that she could have promoted. If that end is morally obligatory, it seems plausible to say that 
she violates her duty, at least once she has made a principle of her ineffective help. Imperfect 
duties to others require not merely that, given the occasion, we do something (no matter how 
irrelevant to the task at hand), but that we do something that constitute a reasonable 
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contribution to furthering an end. This is a matter of what it means to have actually made an 
end one’s own, as opposed to merely professing commitment to this end.  
Secondly, our proposal that beneficence calls at least for acts that constitute reasonable 
contributions, of course, raises the question of what the standard of reasonableness is here.31 
We take it that this greatly depends on an agent’s means, resources and history of helping 
others. Wherever the exact threshold for reasonable help lies, the billionaire who in every 
single case only donates 1 cent strikes us intuitively as inadequate. It is legitimate to appeal to 
our intuitions here and to read Kant’s ethics as intended to be largely in line with our intuitive 
or pre-theoretical notion of morality, since it is Kant’s expressed aim to clarify, systematize 
and vindicate ‘common moral rational cognition’ (G 4: 393.3).32 It is therefore plausible to 
assume that the standard of reasonableness that is at play here is not a technical one, but rather 
one that is already present in how non-philosophers think about what counts as beneficent 
help and what does not. 
Thirdly, what if the billionaire only donates 1 cent, but from duty and from no other motive? 
Should that not qualify as a morally worthy action and as meritorious? Presumably, Kant 
would say that if the billionaire genuinely believed that she helps someone and does it from 
duty then, yes. But Kant would also caution us. After all, he was a keen observer of human 
frailty and in particular of the phenomenon of self-deception, which he discusses under the 
label of ‘rationalizing’ (Vernünfteln) in many passages.33 A wealthy person who claims to be 
committed to beneficence, but who only ever donates tiny increments or performs actions that 
make no perceptible difference rather appears to be someone who is self-deceived about his 
ends and actions and who wants to maintain the illusion that he is beneficent whilst keeping 
the majority of his resources to himself. Whilst Kant appreciates good intentions above all 
else, he is not committed to the view that anyone who professes to have good intentions and 




Kant holds a particularly strong version of MR. He believes that perfect duty can silence the 
normative standing of non-moral concerns. Imperfect duties are more complicated within this 
framework, though, since they allow for latitude. Imperfect duties can silence inclinations in 
cases of conflicts. We have to adopt certain ends, no matter what we are inclined to do, and 
we may not make it our principle to act against or be indifferent to these ends. However, this 
does not mean that agents must do all they can in order to further these ends. Our 
interpretation shares Timmermann’s view that Kant advocates silencing, but in the important 
case of duties of beneficence and other imperfect duties, this does not rule out that we take 
our own happiness into consideration even if we could further an obligatory end. Our 
interpretation has the advantage that it can account for Kant’s strong claims about the absolute 
priority duty enjoys, but it also shows that Kant is not as demanding as Timmermann thinks 
he is.  
 
Notes
1 Groundwork translations follow Kant (2011), other Kant translations are, with occasional 
modifications, from Kant (1996). The following abbreviations are used: CPR: Critique of 
Pure Reason, G: Groundwork, CPrR: Critique of Practical Reason, Rel: Religion, MM: 
Metaphysics of Morals, Anth: Anthropology, TP: On the Common Saying, RPT: On a 
Recently Prominent Tone of Superiority in Philosophy, Ped: Pedagogy, Refl: Reflections, L-
Eth Vigil: Lecture notes Vigilantius, L-Eth Mr2: Lecture notes Mrongovius 2.  
2 See van Ackeren and Sticker (2015) for such an attempt. On attempts to define the threshold 
between demandingness and overdemandingness, see Hooker (2009). 







4 Classical examples with regard to Kant are certain coordination maxims. It should be noted 
that this caveat does not mean that we think that false-negative objections against the CI can 
be sustained. 
5 Note that the opposition of moral and non-moral reasons is not strictly necessary for MR to 
be true (see Portmore 2011: 39fn.32). Theories, such as ancient eudaemonism, that claim that 
morality and well-being can never conflict can still endorse MR. 
6 See Griffin (1986: ch.5) for further critical discussion of non-commensurability. It should be 
noted that many only consider what we call strong MR as MR (see Archer 2014, Dorsey 
2016), and consider the view that morality merely generates rational permissions a form of 
moral anti-rationalism (see Dorsey 2016: ch.1). 
7 This is overridingness in its strongest form. For various distinctions, see Archer (2014: §1). 
8 For our present purpose, we will not distinguish Raz’s (1999) idea of exclusionary reasons 
from silencing. Crisp in his commentary thankfully stresses that there is an important 
difference between a normative and deliberative view of silencing. Admittedly, our 
interpretation blurs this distinction. However, it is difficult to attribute only one of the two 
views to Kant. This needs a more detailed discussion.  
9 See Horty (2007 and 2012) for critical discussion of contemporary forms of silencing. 
10 Timmermann seems to be the first to make extensive use of the term ‘silencing’ in Kant 
scholarship (Timmermann 2005: sec.1, 2007a: 19, 2007b: sec.2), but he does not discuss the 
term in the context of current forms of MR and other current forms of silencing, as we do in 
this section, nor in the context of the demandingness debate. In addition, he (2007b: 169) 
thinks that silencing is a form of lexical priority. However, it is rather an alternative to this, as 





11 See also Kant’s somewhat more obscure claim, that personal advantage can be ‘separated 
and washed from every particle of reason’ (CPrR 5: 93.5-6).  
12 Gregor (Kant 1996: 209) translates: ‘before which all inclinations are numb’. This does not 
preserve the idea that inclinations are made silent/numb by the moral law, as indicated by the 
German verstummen. 
13 Korsgaard (1996: 119), for instance, believes that ‘the good will is the source of all the 
good in the world’.  
14 G 4: 396.24-37, CPrR 5: 61.24-9, 93.11-15, Rel 6: 46.31-40, L-Eth Mr2: 600.1-2. 
15 In RPT 8: 402, it does indeed look as if Kant has a psychological conception in mind, 
according to which the silenced consideration does not even appear as relevant to an agent. 
The majority of passages, however, shows that normatively silenced considerations of self-
interest still affect agents psychologically. It is only an ideally rational agent who would not 
be affected by these considerations anymore. 
16 Raz doubts the distinction between moral and non-moral reasons as two context-
independent sub-classes of practical reason (see Raz 1999). 
17 For more on the conditioning relation between morality and happiness see CPR A808-
15/B836-43, CPrR 5: 130.11-28, MM 6: 481.16-21, Anth 7: 326.11-14, Refl 15: 456.20-26, 
Refl 19: 284.28-285.2, 288.12-14. 
18 If MR presupposes that the priority of morality holds true for the entire class of moral 
reasons, as, for instance, Archer (2014: Introduction) assumes, then McDowell’s view cannot 
be classified as MR, because he believes that some moral reasons can be outweighed by non-
moral reasons.  
19 See the second gallows case in CPrR 5: 30 as an example. See van Ackeren and Sticker 





20 Kantians of course have, in response to the infamous murderer-at-the-door case, proposed a 
number of promising ways to make Kant’s MR and the context-insensitivity of the 
Categorical Imperative more palatable. See, pars pro toto, Korsgaard (1996: ch.5). 
21 There is a vast amount of literature on latitude. We cannot do this literature justice here. 
One of the most influential approaches is Hill’s latitudinarianism (1992: ch.8). According to 
this reading, obligatory ends only require that we do something to further them, but we are 
free to decide when we do it and how much we do. We, by contrast, will argue that only the 
‘how much’ is up to us – but this makes Kant already less demanding than on Timmermann’s 
reading (see below). 
22 Of course, this might not always be so. I might have promised to save a person and I might 
owe certain people help because I participated in or have benefited from injustices committed 
against them (MM 6: 453.1-33, 454.22-8). We shall remain agnostic about these cases and 
focus on cases that are best understood as falling under beneficence.  
23 Another very demanding conception of imperfect duties to others is Cummiskey’s (1990: 
sec.7) ‘Spartan’ interpretation of Kantian beneficence as demanding the same level of 
sacrifice as certain consequentialist normative theories that command to maximize an 
impersonal good. This is meant to show that Kantians should endorse consequentialist 
normative principles. Timmermann does not believe that Kant’s ethics is consequentialist in 
any sense, but it is interesting that those who stress the affinities between Kantianism and 
consequentialism likewise advocate a very demanding reading of beneficence. 
24 See also: ‘in comparison and contrast’ with morality, ‘life with all its agreeableness has no 
worth at all’ (CPrR 5: 88.16-9), i.e. once there is a contrast or at least a comparison, the 





25 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for encouraging us to say more about the two 
different kinds of conflicts and Kant’s MR. 
26 See also: ‘But this distinction of the principle of happiness from that of morality is not, for 
this reason, at once an opposition, between them, and pure practical reason does not require 
that one should renounce claims to happiness but only that as soon as duty is in question, one 
should take no account of them’ (CPrR 5: 93.11-5). Happiness and morality can come apart 
without opposition or conflict. 
27 This is already in a nutshell in the Groundwork: ‘To be beneficent where one can is one’s 
duty’ (G 4: 398.8), i.e. we have to be beneficent whenever there is an occasion for it, but Kant 
does not say that we also have to do as much as we possibly can in these cases. In the lecture 
notes Vigilantius, it is stated explicitly that ‘the duty of well-doing determines only that I 
should support the other out of my means, but how much remains absolutely reserved to the 
measures of my needs, my resources, and the other’s distress’ (L-Eth Vigil 27: 536.21-537.8). 
28 See also Pinheiro Walla (2015: 734): ‘latitude shrinks away when refusing to help would 
amount to giving up one’s commitment to beneficence altogether’.  
29 Stohr (2011: 46) for instance points out that utilitarians could criticize Kant for being 
underdemanding or that ‘Kantianism is not adequately demanding when it comes to 
beneficence’, because latitude might leave too much leeway. 
30 We take it that the same is the case for direct donations to poor people. It is unlikely that a 
beggar will be able to afford one more item of food, etc. due to such an incremental donation; 
and such a donation would in fact rather be seen as an insult, thus violating Kant’s dictum that 
we must take care not to humiliate those we intend to help (MM 6: 448.22-449.2, 453.17-33). 
It is of course possible that the 1 cent makes a positive difference and that this is foreseeable, 





blanket or emergency meal that a charity will purchase and send to the worst off. But even in 
this case the 1 cent is most likely parasitic on other individuals donating substantially more, 
given that 1 cent is only incremental with respect to the cost of a blanket or meal.  
31 We thank an anonymous referee for pressing us on this point. 
32 This is not only his aim in the Groundwork. In the Second Critique, Kant stresses that he 
does not aim to “introduce a new principle of all morality and, as it were, first invent it” 
(CPrR 5: 8.fn). See Grenberg (2013) and Sticker (2017a) for discussion of Kant’s 
systematization and vindication of the ordinary conception of morality. 
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